


De-merging Traffic Enforcement from Police

**Analysis of information to review
costs and benefits**

Report to State Services Commission

28 March 2007



Preface

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Executive Summary

Introduction

The Government has charged the State Services Commission (SSC) with carrying out an evaluation of “the costs and benefits of de-merging traffic enforcement from the Police”. The SSC is to provide a high-level overview of the pros, cons and risks of de-merging to assist in determining whether more detailed investigation is warranted.

This report forms part of the evaluation being undertaken by the SSC. Specifically, this report is to review the available information to determine the likely costs and benefits of separating traffic enforcement activities from the Police.

Overall Conclusions

At a fundamental level, this analysis is asked to determine whether the delivery of two related services is best achieved via one agency or two. Analysis of the institutional nature of the services suggests that neither of the two delivery forms analysed here (totally separated vs completely uniform) is compellingly better than the other. However, the risks, costs, and general difficulties associated with the transition to a de-merged state suggest that de-merging traffic services from the Police is not worthwhile.

While the analysis identified that additional benefits could flow from functional specialisation, no specific benefits were identified that would arise as a consequence of a de-merger. On the other hand, the analysis did identify that some current benefits could be lost through a de-merger.

The medium-term fiscal cost of two de-merged entities was estimated to be 3 to 4 per cent higher than the current Police organisation. Basic capital costs in the start-up period amount to \$15 million. Depending on accommodation choices, this could increase significantly.

The transition to de-merged operations would be accompanied by a number of risks. Of particular concern is the possibility that de-merger processes and disruption would result in poorer outcomes for both road safety and general policing during the transition period. Other issues relate to acquiring staff for the new traffic organisation, the potential for redundancies amongst the Police, and managing on-going relationships between the new entities.

Overall, de-merging traffic enforcement from the Police is expected to result in higher costs of service delivery in the short to medium term for no readily identifiable long-term benefit. In addition, there are major risks of benefit losses in the transition period. This suggests de-merging traffic enforcement from the Police is not worthwhile from most viewpoints.

Background

The merger of the Police and the TSS originated in the 1990 National Party election manifesto. The reasons given for the proposed merger were the human suffering caused by accidents and the economic savings that would arise from stopping the carnage on our roads. This focus on road safety was apparent in the May 1991 review of the proposed merger.

Enforcement of road safety was stepped up several times in the years following the merger. This focus on road safety resulted in a degree of public discontent, along with claims that the Police were “revenue gathering”.

Road safety has improved significantly since the 1992 merger. Increased levels of promotion and enforcement have contributed to this improvement, along with improved roads, safer cars, and fewer motorcycles.

On the other hand, it seems likely that increased enforcement of road safety would have occurred regardless of the merger. On this basis, it is unclear how much, if any, of the improvement can be attributed to the merger.

Public Perceptions

In general, public trust and confidence in the Police is high. This support has not notably declined due to increased levels of traffic enforcement.

Enforcement of road safety is strongly supported by the public. Ninety per cent of people polled (in 2006) thought recent levels of enforcement were either about right or not high enough.

A majority of the public support the Police retaining traffic enforcement, but most of these people wish to see greater delineation of traffic enforcement from general policing. In total, 80 per cent of survey respondents wish to see either formal separation of functions, or greater distinction between the roles within the Police organisation. However, it is not clear that this is a rational view. New Zealand studies have shown that the public overestimate the risk from crime, while overseas studies have found that the risk associated with motor vehicles is under-estimated. Their expressed desire for some form of separation of police and traffic duties may stem from this mismatch of perceptions and reality.

Police Funding

Analysis of funding trends indicates that there is some flexibility in resource usage between general policing and road safety. This is to be expected, and is one of the advantages of having one delivery agency rather than two.

Delivery of the road safety programme closely matches budgeted levels. This indicates that the changes in output delivery have been intentional and budgeted for rather than diverted to meet immediate needs. Indeed, given

that road safety is actually funded from the National Land Transport Fund, the Police have a contractual responsibility to deliver the hours they are funded for.

Both general policing and road safety have received increased funding in real terms. Overall, the data does not suggest that one Police function has grown at the expense of the other.

Cost of De-Merging Police and Traffic

Two initial de-merger scenarios were costed.

The first scenario assumed that salaries of Traffic Officer would remain at Police levels, and all traffic staff were accommodated in purchased premises separate from the Police. This scenario generated high operating and capital costs.

The second scenario assumed that new Traffic Officers would be employed on lower salary rates, and used a mix of accommodation options for the new organisation.

Neither scenario allowed for any savings to be made from premises vacated by officers transferring to the new organisation. The results of these costings are summarised in Table 1.

The costs shown in the table are the incremental costs of the two new organisations over and above those incurred currently by the single Police organisation. Both scenarios assume that the level of service provision is similar to that achieved at present.

The first scenario estimated the on-going increase in appropriations to be approximately \$73 million (+7%) per year. Capital expenditure of \$222 million was estimated, largely for accommodation purposes. This scenario is considered to produce unrealistically high costs.

The second scenario estimated on-going appropriations of nearly \$37 million (+4%) per year (but declining¹), with capital requirements of \$81 million. The actual outcome of a de-merger could be either higher or lower than this scenario.

¹ This cost excess would eventually decline to around 2.3 per cent of current operations. It is expected that it would take in excess of 10 years to reach this point.

Table 1 Summary of De-Merger Costs

Incremental cost – thousand dollars

	Scenario 1		Scenario 2	
	Yr 1 - 3	Yr 4+	Yr 1 - 3	Yr 4+
Salaries	99,600	33,200	47,010	11,390
Other opex	31,609	10,698	37,071	12,810
Total cash	131,209	43,898	84,081	24,200
Depreciation	28,396	12,051	17,312	6,585
Capital charge	35,370	16,635	13,653	6,079
Appropriations	194,975	72,584	115,046	36,864
Capital	221,796		81,047	

Source: NZ Police
NZIER

De-merger costs could be reduced further by increased sharing of premises between Traffic and Police. If half the traffic staff shared premises with the Police, the on-going costs of the de-merger could be reduced to \$29 million (+3%) per year. Capital costs could be reduced to just \$15 million by utilising rental properties rather than purchased buildings.

In summary, the costs of de-merging Traffic functions from the Police vary significantly according to the form of the de-merger. Medium-term costs would be 3 to 4 per cent higher than current levels, but could go as high as 7 per cent if less efficient accommodation options were chosen. Basic capital costs are modest (\$15m net) but could increase substantially if buildings are purchased.

Pros and Cons of Alternate Structures

The argument surrounding whether to retain the current merged structure for the Police and Traffic services or de-merge them is essentially one of flexibility vs focus. Both approaches can work well. However, any decision to move to a focused approach will necessarily incur transitional costs.

A key issue to resolve is whether current legislation grants Traffic Officers (as distinct from Police Officers) sufficient powers to carry out their road policing activities. If not, then enabling legislation to provide these powers will be part of any de-merger process.

Risks of Alternate Structures

Any transition to a new structure will be accompanied by significant de-merger processes and disruption. This carries a real risk that poorer outcomes will be achieved in either or both of the key output areas.

Salaries are a key issue. If Traffic Officer salaries were comparable to those of the Police, then other employment groups are likely to benchmark

themselves against Traffic Officers for their salary negotiations. On the other hand, if new Traffic Officers were given lower salaries than Police Officers, this would make it difficult to entice existing Police staff to join the new organisation. In turn, this could lead to both high redundancies amongst Police staff, and inadequate staff numbers (particularly amongst experienced staff) in the new organisation to maintain the focus on road safety.

International Experience

International evidence is mixed. Most countries have combined Police and Traffic services. However, where traffic services are provided by a combined force, there is concern that traffic duties will be neglected. Specialisation of traffic services, even if it is within a unified organisation, is seen as desirable in delivery of road safety outputs.

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1. Introduction

Under the terms of the *Confidence and Supply Agreement with New Zealand First*, the Government has undertaken to “*evaluate the costs and benefits of de-merging traffic enforcement from the Police*”. The Government has charged the State Services Commission (SSC) with this evaluation.

The objective of the evaluation being undertaken by the SSC is to provide Ministers with a high-level overview of the pros, cons, and risks of de-merging, to assist in determining whether more detailed investigation is warranted.

This report forms part of the evaluation being undertaken by the SSC. Specifically, this report is to review the available information to determine the likely costs and benefits of separating traffic enforcement activities from the Police force.

1.1 Background

Prior to 1992, traffic enforcement was the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport. This was carried out by their Traffic Safety Service (TSS) branch in cooperation with and with assistance from the Police. Even then, the Police had the power to enforce traffic laws. However, given the institutional arrangement, the majority of the active enforcement was carried out by the TSS.

The 1990 National Party election manifesto stated that a National Government would merge the TSS with the Police. “*The reasons given for the merger were the human suffering caused by accidents and the economic savings which would arise from stopping the carnage on our roads.*”¹

The Review of Traffic Safety Enforcement completed in May 1991 recommended the merging of the TSS and the Police “*to achieve safer roads, better policing generally, and greater efficiency*”. It was noted that full integration of the two services would have net fiscal costs in all years, but it would bring “*very substantial benefits by enabling a new and major programme to bring down the road toll to take place*”.

It is clear from the above that improved traffic safety was the prime motivation for the merger between the two services. However, the Review document did note that better policing would also be achieved as the result of improved coordination between traffic and general police staff, increased speed of response with more units available, and the ability of traffic staff to

¹ “Report of the Review of Traffic Safety Enforcement”, p. i, May 1991

arrest criminals encountered on the roads without having to call in a general duties car.

Following the Review and subsequent Consultation document, the final decision to merge the two services was announced in December 1991, with the merger taking effect from 1 July, 1992.

1.2 Options analysed

Only two options are considered in the analysis: (1) status quo and (2) de-merging traffic enforcement from the Police. It is assumed that the situation after de-merger would be similar to that before 1 July 1992.

Other structural arrangements are possible. One that recurred frequently in discussions was to move to a higher degree of separation of traffic enforcement from general policing within the current Police organisation.

These alternative structural arrangements were not investigated because they were outside the scope of the current review.

1.3 Report structure

De-merging traffic enforcement from the Police represents a change in the method of providing services to the public. Normally where such changes are proposed, the reasons for the change are well articulated and provide some criteria against which both current and proposed alternative structures can be measured.

The de-merger proposal being evaluated in this report suffers from a lack of well defined reasons supporting the need for change. Accordingly, Section 2 begins by positing some reasons for the proposed change. Having established some reasons why a de-merger is being proposed, a framework for the analysis is considered. This section concludes with some notes on data limitations encountered during the study.

Section 3 works through the quantitative aspects of the evaluation. This begins with a brief history of changes in road safety enforcement and then looks at the trends in road safety measures. Trends in public perceptions are then examined, followed by changes in expenditure on road safety relative to general policing. Finally, some cost estimates of service provision via de-merged agencies are provided.

Section 4 is a brief qualitative analysis. The pros and cons of the existing structure are outlined, followed by an equivalent analysis of a de-merged structure. The risks of alternative structures are also outlined.

Section 5 contains an examination of the institutional nature of the services provided, and the appropriate organisational structures. Section 6 contains

an overview of international experience, with more detailed findings in Appendix A. Finally, Section 7 summarises the findings of this paper.

2. Framework

2.1 Reasons for De-merger

The reasons for the proposed de-merger have not been explicitly stated. However, perusal of news reports over recent years suggests the following general themes:

- That front-line Police do not have sufficient resources to fight crime (respond to burglaries, 111 calls etc)
- That road safety is consuming Police resources at the expense of general policing.

These themes are supported by perceptions that:

- the Police have become “revenue gatherers” for the Government
- such “revenue gathering” does not contribute to road safety
- the Police have to achieve “quotas” of road safety infringement notices.

Other reported factors include:

- *“less cooperation from the public in gathering hard evidence, greater reluctance to do jury service, and to generally act as the eyes and ears for the Police²”*
- a decline in public confidence and trust in the Police.

The bulk of this paper is aimed at investigating these perceptions.

2.2 Value of De-merger

Currently about half of the traffic enforcement is carried out by road policing staff³ whose main job it is to carry out traffic enforcement duties. The other half of traffic enforcement is carried out by a number of general duties staff assigned to general policing duties who carry out varying amounts of traffic enforcement. All road policing staff will carry out some general duties, and most general duties staff will carry out some traffic enforcement.

Prior to the merger in 1992, Traffic Officers were dedicated to traffic enforcement, while Police were dedicated to fighting crime – including

² http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display_item.php?t=0&i=1285

³ However, many of these staff will rotate to other Police activities as part of their career progression. There are relatively few Police staff who are permanent road safety professionals.

occasional enforcement of traffic law. Following the merger, Police staff have carried out a mixture of traffic enforcement and general policing. While this has brought benefits from the higher powers available to a Police Officer (relative to a Traffic Officer) and increased visibility of traffic enforcement (any Police car could be enforcing traffic rules), there have been criticisms that traffic enforcement does not require the skill set of a Police Officer, and that the Police should focus on fighting crime.

In the abstract, the current system provides benefits in the areas of crime reduction and road safety. If we change the structure of the current system such that the current Police Officers are divided into two groups, there are four possible outcomes:

1. both types of benefits are greater than or equal to current delivery
2. crime reduction benefits are maintained or increased but road safety benefits decrease
3. road safety benefits are maintained or increased but crime reduction benefits decrease
4. both types of benefits decrease

Following a de-merger, each group would concentrate on a narrower range of activities which may lead to higher level of specialisation and increased efficiency. The outcome will depend on the effectiveness of this specialisation.

In general, a type 1 de-merger would be considered, while a type 4 de-merger would not. For de-mergers of type 2 or 3 to be considered further, the additional benefits obtained in one of the output areas would have to offset the loss of benefits from the other output area (or offset the cost of additional resources to lift those benefits back to their previous level).

2.3 Data Issues

Analysis has been significantly hindered by a lack of consistent data over suitably long time periods.

- Some data series are incomplete – it is unclear whether matching data was not collected in the missing years, or whether it has not been obtainable
- Other “series” have changes in definitions, thereby producing two non-matching series, each covering part of the timeframe
- The more comprehensive attitudinal surveys tend to represent points in time and do not necessarily link to equivalent questions at other points in time.

Even series that record “hard” data (rather than “soft” data such as opinions or attitudes) suffer from these problems. Hospitalisation and injury rates from traffic accidents both showed sharp increases in recent years due to changes in reporting practices. Likewise, the number of recorded crimes reduced in 1996 due to a definitional change.

In general, the low numbers of observations in the data series prohibits sophisticated data analysis.

Even where there is good data, separating out the effects of the merger from all the other relevant variables is not possible. For example, road deaths and serious injury rates have reduced substantially. While enforcement (amongst other factors) can be shown to be a significant contributor to the improvement, we cannot attribute the increased enforcement to the merger.

3. Findings

3.1 Traffic Enforcement 1992 to 2006

Enforcement of road safety rules has increased significantly since 1992. This coincides with the period when the Police and the TSS have operated as a combined entity. However, it seems likely that enforcement would have been increased regardless of the merger in an effort to improve road safety.

On this basis, the increased enforcement did not occur because of the merger, but rather followed the merger. Nevertheless, from the public’s perspective, the merger between the TSS and the Police has been followed by strict enforcement of road rules. It is almost inevitable that many people view the merger as the “cause” of the increased enforcement.

These themes and their implications will be expanded upon later in this document. But first, the following sections outline some of the changes that have occurred in traffic enforcement since the merger, and the associated road safety statistics that are used as indicators of success or otherwise for road safety policies.

3.1.1 Changes in enforcement

Almost all road safety studies identify the major behavioural issues to be addressed to achieve improved road safety as speed, alcohol (and other substances/drugs), and use of restraint mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, enforcement has focused on these areas.

Compulsory breath testing (CBT) was introduced in April 1993, and followed 9 years of random breath testing (RBT). The distinction between CBT and RBT was that under CBT, all drivers stopped at checkpoints were

to be breath tested rather than only those suspected of having been drinking under the RBT programme.

Speed cameras were introduced in October 1993. Initially, these were only used in designated areas, with signposts warning motorists that speed cameras could be in operation. In 2003, it was announced these restrictions would be abolished, and replaced by an “Anytime, anywhere” policy for speed camera placement.

A ‘Supplementary Road Safety Package’ (SRSP) commenced in the 1995-96 year. The SRSP included substantial increases in promotion of road safety, with speed, alcohol, and use of restraints being the main targets. The programme also included additional enforcement hours and new detection devices (for breath alcohol and speed).

The Highway Patrol was formed as a specialist unit inside the Police in early 2001 to provide dedicated traffic policing. This was accompanied by increased enforcement of road rules. In particular, the tolerance allowed before ticketing speeding drivers was standardised to 10 km/hr⁴. Education within the Police linking reduced road speeds to benefits from crash reduction reinforced the general thrust of increased enforcement. These changes resulted in significant increases in the number of traffic infringement notices issued over the 2001 to 2004 period.

A further increase in enforcement was announced in 2003. This included reductions in speed tolerance before loss of licence, increased penalties for drink-driving, as well as the change in speed camera policy already mentioned.

The general intent of these changes was to change public attitudes and behaviour through a mix of promotion and enforcement. The consequent effect of these activities was to make traffic policing a high profile component of the overall Police operation. Indeed, for a large proportion of the public, traffic enforcement would have been their only contact with the Police.

Some Police enforcement tactics during the period provoked significant public reaction. For example, Police were photographed hiding in bushes beside the motorway while operating a radar gun. This was seen by some as blatant “revenue gathering”. Covert operations were subsequently banned by the Police in 2004. Likewise, the example of a Taihape Police officer issuing over 100 infringement notices in a single shift was also controversial. While these actions were part of the general process of changing public attitudes, they were widely portrayed as “going too far”.


⁴ Prior to this, the tolerance limit was discretionary and was not publicised.

3.1.2 Road Safety Outcomes

Most indicators of road safety have improved during the period since the Traffic Safety Service was merged into the Police:

- Road deaths and hospitalisation rates⁵ have declined. The 2006 road toll of 390 was the lowest since 1960 despite increased vehicle numbers and traffic densities
- Average open road speeds have declined, along with the proportion of drivers exceeding the open road speed limit.

Figure 1 Trends in Road Deaths and Speed
1987 to 2006



Source: Ministry of Transport
NZIER

Analysis of these indicators (see Figure 1) suggests that the increased levels of enforcement and promotion have been successful⁶. However, the contribution of safer cars, safer roads, and lower numbers of motorcycles (relative to the 1970s) must also be acknowledged⁷.

No judgement can be made on the effectiveness of the merger from these trends on the basis that increased levels of enforcement and promotion would likely have occurred even without the merger, with probable similar outcomes. However, it needs to be acknowledged that if similar levels of enforcement were to have been achieved without a merger, then it would have required a high level of cooperation between the Police and the TSS, and significant levels of Police resources may still have been (periodically) devoted to road safety. Alternatively, TSS resources could have been

⁵ Hospital admission rates for greater than 1 and 3 days have declined. However, general hospital admission rates have deviated from this trend due to changes in reporting practices.

⁶ See “An evaluation of the Supplementary Road Safety Package, July 1995 to June 2000”, Land Transport Safety Authority.

⁷ Safer cars and roads were estimated to be significant in the analysis.

increased. This would potentially have led to comparisons being made by the public about relative resource levels between the Police and the TSS. This is not significantly different from what appears to be the current situation.

The underlying issue here is that we can judge the effectiveness of *actions* that have taken place, but not whether those actions have been enhanced or otherwise by the choice of delivery organisation(s). Specifically, was the delivery of the higher levels of enforcement and promotion better with a combined Police/TSS organisation than they would have been coming from the TSS alone (with Police support)?


3.1.3 General Policing Outcomes

While the focus in this document is on traffic enforcement, the 1992 merger did increase the number of Police Officers and potentially impacted on the outcomes for general policing. Indeed, better policing and increased efficiency were cited amongst the reasons for the merger.

The figure below shows the trend in recorded offences and resolution rates for 1990-91 to the present.

Figure 2 Trends in Recorded Offences

Excluding traffic infringements



Source: NZ Police
NZIER

The chart shows that recorded offences⁸ have generally tracked downwards through the period. This is generally consistent with other western

⁸ It is generally acknowledged that recorded offences are a poor indicator of the actual crime rate. The United Nations notes that “Crime statistics are often better indicators of prevalence of law enforcement and willingness to report crime, than actual prevalence”.

democracies around the world, and is generally attributed to an ageing population.

The number of crimes resolved has remained relatively stable, except for a brief surge immediately following the merger with the TSS. Given that the increase in resolutions was not sustained, it seems difficult to attribute this to the merger.

Overall, the combination of declining offences and stable resolutions has led to an increasing proportion of reported offences being solved.

Did the 1992 merger have any impact on general policing? Figure 2 provides no evidence that the merger either helped or hindered the Police in their general policing duties.

3.2 Public Perceptions

3.2.1 Public Trust and Confidence

a) Time Series Trends

The recorded data on Public Trust and Confidence in the Police is shown in the figure below:

Figure 3 Public Trust and Confidence in Police

Per cent satisfied or very satisfied



Source: MM Research (quoted in NZ Police Annual Reports)
NZIER

While some data is available for the pre-merger period, this is not on a consistent basis with that shown above.

The average rating over the period from 1993-94 to 2005-06 was 68 per cent. The low of 58 per cent was recorded in 1996-97 and a high of 76 per

cent in 2002-03 and 2003-04. The latest available measurement was 70 per cent in 2005-06. Confidence intervals of these measurements are not stated⁹.


Overall, this does not support claims that confidence in the Police is falling. In fact, trust and confidence in the Police has been higher throughout the 2000s than in the mid to late 1990s.

While there was a drop in confidence in 2004-05, confidence has since recovered. This drop coincided with widespread publicity over claims of Police sexual predation (February 2004) and problems with responses to 111 calls.

Traffic enforcement increased significantly over this later period of observations (as was noted in Section 3.1.1). The figure below graphs trust and confidence against the number of traffic infringements issued. Speed camera infringements are excluded as no “contact” takes place between the Police and the public in the course of the infringement. Further, speed cameras were in operation throughout the period analysed.

Figure 4 Public Trust vs Traffic Infringements

1993-94 to 2005-06



Source: MM Research (quoted in NZ Police Annual Reports)
 NZ Police
 NZIER

This graph shows that the peak period of trust and confidence in the Police coincided with the peak issuance of traffic infringement notices. Several interpretations are possible from this graph.

- Public trust and confidence may be independent of whether members of the public have received infringement notices

⁹ Earlier surveys by Heylen Research Centre indicated a 95 per cent Confidence Interval of +/-2.8 per cent for a measurement of 70 per cent trust and confidence (N = 1000).

- The issuance of infringement notices may have contributed to higher trust and confidence ratings as this was seen to be in the public interest
- Any negative impact of increased enforcement took time to build in public sentiment and had a delayed impact on trust and confidence.

With confidence rebounding in the latest year and issuance of traffic infringements still high, it is clear that any negative impact of enforcement has been limited.


3.2.2 Public Attitudes to Road Safety Enforcement

The Ministry of Transport¹⁰ carries out annual surveys of public attitudes to road safety. The latest available survey data was collected in 2006.

Survey participants were asked about the level of road safety enforcement. At the start of the period (1997), nearly two-thirds of survey participants thought that “Police effort into catching people breaking road safety laws” should be increased; nearly one-third thought Police efforts were about right at the time; and just 3 per cent thought road safety enforcement was excessive at the time. See Figure 5.

Figure 5 Public Attitudes to Road Policing

Enforcement of road safety laws should be increased / decreased / is about right?
Per cent



Source: Ministry of Transport
NZIER

Enforcement of road safety has increased during the period since 1997, significantly so from 2001 onwards – see the number of infringement notices issued in Figure 4. This was reflected by a declining number of people who thought road safety enforcement should be increased, and

¹⁰ The surveys were formerly carried by the Land Transport Safety Authority. The Ministry of Transport took over responsibility in 2005.

increasing numbers of people who thought current enforcement was about right or excessive.

These trends peaked in 2005 when 12 per cent of respondents thought enforcement should be decreased. However, these views remained heavily outweighed by those who thought enforcement was about right (48%) or should be increased (38%). Overall, 86 per cent of respondents thought enforcement was about right or should be increased in 2005.

By 2006, this proportion had increased to 90 per cent, comprising 46 per cent thinking enforcement was about right, and 44 per cent wanting enforcement increased. The proportion of respondents thinking enforcement should be decreased had declined to 9 per cent.

Overall, this is a very high level of support for enforcement of road safety. This supports the inference made from the public trust and confidence surveys that road safety enforcement is not causing significant harm to the reputation of the Police.

3.2.3 Public Attitudes to Police Activities

Other UMR Research surveys found mixed support for splitting road safety functions out of the Police – see the table below:

Table 2 Public Attitudes to Police Activities

Per cent

Question	2003	2005	2007
Traffic enforcement should be separated	57	43	36
Police & traffic should be kept together	39	15	17
Police should handle both duties but be more distinct		40	44
Don't know / depends	4	2	3

Notes: Confidence interval (95%) $\pm 3.6\%$

Source: UMR Research
NZIER

Direct comparison of public attitudes through time is difficult because an additional option was offered in 2005 and 2007 that was not present in 2003.

In 2003, a majority (57%) of those surveyed thought that traffic enforcement should be separated from the Police. This proportion has declined through time to 43 per cent in 2005 and 36 per cent in 2007. Note, however, that some of this decline may have been due to the inclusion of another option in the 2005 and 2007 surveys.

In contrast, the number of people thinking that traffic enforcement should be retained within the Police increased from 39 per cent in 2003 to 55 per cent in 2005 and 61 per cent in 2007. However, in these latter two surveys, the majority of people who thought that the Police should handle both duties, also thought there should be greater distinction between the two roles.

In total, some form of separation of the two roles (either formal separation or remain within the Police but with greater role distinction) was supported by 83 per cent of respondents in 2005 and 80 per cent in 2007. This suggests that a large majority of the general public views the role of traffic enforcement as being different from the role of the Police generally. At the same time, there is acknowledgement that the roles are related as evidenced by the fact that 61 per cent of people want the Police to carry out both roles.

Overall, this reveals that the public have quite mixed views about Police involvement in traffic enforcement:

- current levels of traffic enforcement enjoy high support (90%)
- there is increasing support for the Police to retain the traffic functions, and conversely, decreasing support for formal separation
- there is very high support (80%) for either full separation or greater distinction of traffic enforcement from general police duties. Even amongst those who think the Police should handle both functions, a majority believe there should be greater distinction between the roles
- the least favoured option is for a continuation of the status quo.

It is apparent that the public don't want less traffic enforcement. Their dilemma is whether traffic enforcement should be provided by the Police, by a more distinctive sub-set of the Police, or by some other organisation. It is important to note that continuation with the status quo delivery by the Police is the least favoured option.

Interpretation of this becomes speculative. What exactly does it mean for the duties to be "more distinct" in the context of the Police handling both functions? What does the public gain from this greater distinction of roles? Or from total separation?

Greater separation of the two roles means that each role will become more focussed. Therefore, the Police will focus on police issues, while traffic enforcement is carried out by someone else. This is the heart of the issue – it is not that the public are dissatisfied about traffic enforcement – rather, they want the Police to focus on police issues without diversion by traffic duties.

This may be an issue of perceptions versus reality. The perception is that crime levels are high, and therefore the public wish more resources to be devoted to fighting crime. While they are also concerned about road safety, this is less of an issue than crime.

The reality is that the public overestimate the level of crime in society¹¹. Given the relatively lesser concern over the level of road deaths and injuries (nearly 400 and 15,000 per annum respectively), the public may also underestimate the risks associated with motor vehicle use¹².


Therefore, even if the public do wish to see some form of separation of police and traffic duties, it does not automatically follow that this is the best course of action.

3.2.4 Information Provided to Police

There has been some concern¹³ that any loss of trust and confidence in Police will result in the general public providing lesser quantities of information to Police to assist them in their work. Figure 6 shows the trends in information received from the public.

Figure 6 Information received from the Public

Number of information receipts



Source: NZ Police
NZIER

The general information provided by the public to the Police is shown to be quite variable¹⁴, ranging from 6,300 information receipts in 1994-95 to a peak of 23,400 in 2002-03.

¹¹ See: 'Attitudes to Crime and Punishment: A New Zealand Study', Ministry of Justice, December 2003.

¹² This has been noted in overseas studies. See: Anderson, H (2006), 'Willingness to Pay for Road Safety and Estimates of the Risk of Death', Department of Transport Economics, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute.

¹³ See for example: http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display_item.php?t=0&i=1285 – quoted in section 2.1 of this report.

¹⁴ The data for 1996-97 and 1997-98 looks out of line with the rest of this data series. This cannot be fully explained, but following discussions with the NZ Police, it is believed that this was associated with transition to new Communications Centres and recording systems.

In contrast, the information provided relating to suspicious behaviour (both vehicles and persons) has been on a generally increasing trend. Receipts of information of this type have ranged from 61,300 in 1995-96 to 74,100 in 2005-06.

The steady trend in the information flow for suspicious activity gives some confidence that the public continue to cooperate with the Police. Even though the general information has fluctuated, recent high flows of this type of information tend to reinforce the view that Police traffic enforcement has not had a major negative impact on information flows.

3.2.5 Summary of Public Perceptions

- The public have a high level of support for the Police
- In aggregate, this support has not notably declined due to increased levels of traffic enforcement
- There is a high degree of public support (90% in 2006) for levels of road safety enforcement at least as high as in recent years
- There is moderate support (36% in 2007) for complete separation of traffic functions from the Police, but this support is declining
- There is higher support (61%) for retaining those functions within the Police. However, most of those supporting retention of traffic enforcement within the Police favour more distinction between the two functions
- In total, 80 per cent of the public support either formal separation of traffic enforcement and police roles, or more distinction between the roles within the Police organisation
- Retaining the status quo delivery of traffic enforcement by the Police is the least favoured option

3.3 Police Funding

3.3.1 Funding Trends


The Police budget increased by 61 per cent in nominal terms between 1992-93 and 2005-06. Within this, general Police expenditure increased by 56 per cent while road safety expenditure increased by 85 per cent.

When converted to real¹⁵ expenditure (after inflation), general policing expenditure increased by 19 per cent over the period, road policing by 41 per cent, and total Police expenditure by 23 per cent. This is shown in Figure 7 below.

¹⁵ Expenditure has been deflated by the Consumers Price Index. It is believed that the cost of service provision in the Police is rising faster than general inflation as measured by the CPI. In this case, the real increases in Police expenditure will be less than indicated here.

Figure 7 Trends in Police Expenditure

Million dollars real (1999) and percentage



Source: NZ Police
NZIER

Key points to note from this chart include:

- Real expenditure on general policing declined between 1992-93 and 1997-98. However, it increased in all subsequent years
- Real expenditure on general policing in 2005-06 year was 25 per cent higher than the low point of 1997-98
- In contrast, real expenditure on road safety enforcement increased by 11 per cent between 1997-98 and 2005-06
- In most years, road safety expenditure has ranged between 20 and 22 per cent of total Police expenditure. Its peak proportion was 22.6 per cent in 2003-04.

Road safety expenditure as a percentage of total Police activity shows two peaks in the period reviewed. The first (in 1997-98) was due to a real decline in funding of general policing combined with modest increases in road safety funding. The second (in 2003-04) was during a period of increasing general police activity, and was driven by even greater increases in road safety enforcement.


It should be noted that funding of road safety activities actually comes from the National Land Transport Fund (NLTF). In this context, the fact that road safety activities have varied through time actually reflects the amount of Police time funded by NLTF, rather than the Police altering priorities within their own budget. Any reduction in Police funding for road safety would actually be directed to road construction and maintenance (by the NLTF) rather than to general policing.

3.3.2 Delivery of Road Safety Hours Compared With Budget

The following chart compares the Road Safety hours programmed in the Safety (Administration) Programme with those actually delivered by the Police:

Figure 8 Road Safety Hours – Programmed vs Delivered

Thousand hours



Source: NZ Police
NZIER

This shows that there was over-delivery of hours in all years prior to 2000-01. From 2000-01 onwards, delivered hours closely matched programmed hours.

The explanation for the over-delivery in early years and subsequent closer matching of delivery with budget lies in the budgeting process. In the early years, traffic prosecutions were included in general policing for budgeting purposes but included in road safety for delivery hours. Removal of this discrepancy resulted in delivery hours closely matching programmed hours.

3.3.3 General Comments

Figure 7 indicates that there is some flexibility in resource usage between general policing and road safety. This is to be expected, and is one of the advantages of having one delivery agency rather than two.

It should be noted that this flexibility is constrained. A short-term transfer of resources from traffic to general policing would need to be corrected in order for the Police to meet their contractual obligations with the NLTF.

It should also be noted that flexible resource usage is most effective when the outputs being delivered are negatively correlated – that is, the peak demand for road safety activity would ideally occur at off-peak times for

general policing. This is clearly not the case during the peak holiday periods, although no assessment of other periods has been made.

Figure 8 shows that road safety activities closely match budgeted levels – once allowance is made for the erroneous budgeting of earlier years. Taken together with Figure 7, this suggests that the changes in output delivery shown in Figure 7 have been intentional and budgeted for rather than diverted to meet immediate needs.

Both policing functions have received increased funding in real terms. While the road safety increase has been larger, this is partly due to a low base level of funding in 1992-93. Even moving the base year by one year to 1993-94 significantly narrows the gap in terms of funding increases between road safety and general policing. Funding increases for both functions have been similar (+13% real) since 2000-01.

Overall, this does not suggest that one Police function has grown at the expense of the other. However, there is clear evidence of changing priorities, as reflected by the varying proportion of funding to road safety relative to total Police funding. These priority changes could have come from either the Police and/or NLTF (as funder of road safety activities). It is clear that the priorities have been budgeted for, with outcomes closely matching those budgets.

3.3.4 Summary of Police Funding

- Real expenditure on general policing declined from 1992-93 to 1997-98. However, it has increased in all subsequent years with expenditure in 2005-06 being 25 per cent higher than in 1997-98.
- In the period since 1992-93, real expenditure on road safety enforcement has increased at a faster rate than for general policing. However, since 1997-98, the relative increases have been reversed.
- During more recent years (since 2000-01), the growth in real expenditure has been similar (+13%) in both areas.

3.4 Cost of Service Provision

An exercise was carried out to estimate the incremental cost of providing the current level of service provision from two separated entities rather than a single Police force as at present. Two different scenarios were developed.

Both scenarios allowed for a 4 per cent lift in overall staff numbers. This was the Police estimate of the increase in staff numbers required for the two separated entities to provide the same level of service delivery as the current unified organisation.

3.4.1 Scenario One

a) Assumptions

Key assumptions for scenario one included:

- Salaries of front-line traffic staff will be based on the Police salary structure for sworn staff
- Additional staff costs (over and above salary) of front-line traffic staff will match those of current Police staff
- The new organisation will be physically separated from the current Police force. Specific assumptions here include:
 - Staff will be housed in purpose-built (or purchased) buildings
 - There will be no savings in the Police budget from reduced space requirements due to contractual obligations to continue current leases (some spaces vacated being individually small, and/or security concerns over sub-letting space in a Police occupied building)
- Staff will be transferred out of the Police to the new organisation over a 3-year period (see comment in Section 3.4.1 (b) below)
- The new traffic organisation shares the Police Communications Centre on similar lines as the NZ Fire Service
- Training remains with the Royal NZ Police College
- There will be a variety of other costs associated with the startup of the new organisation including branding, development of procedures, capital equipment for new staff, and development of back-office systems.

These assumptions will generate relatively high cost estimates.

It is generally acknowledged that the duties of Traffic Officers will be less demanding than those of Police Officers. The costing implicitly recognises this in the form of shorter initial training periods. Despite this, salaries have been maintained at Police levels on the basis that this is what they currently receive, and it is difficult to reduce salaries for existing staff.

The accommodation assumptions have some basis in reality in that a new organisation will want to be located separately to enable building of a new identity. Further, concerns over security of Police computer systems suggest some form of physical separation is required. This may be difficult to achieve if the existing premises are small (as would be the case in a provincial town).

However, in medium or large centres, it seems likely that sufficient separation can be achieved, even when co-located, by partitioning floor areas, or takeover of whole floors or even buildings. Likewise, such partitioned space could be sublet to new tenants without raising any privacy issues.

A further aspect of the accommodation costs is the assumption that premises will be either built or purchased. This gives the plan high capital costs and on-going capital charges in the annual appropriations. An alternative would be to lease the properties, thereby reducing capital costs of providing accommodation. It seems probable that the lease costs would be similar to the capital charge assumed in the plan, making this change relatively neutral to appropriations while significantly reducing capital requirements.

Several other questions are pertinent:

- How much accommodation space do mobile Traffic Officers really require?
- Where would this accommodation be located?
- Would such accommodation have to meet Police building standards?

No answer is offered to the first question. On the second, given the mobile nature of Traffic Officers, accommodation does not have to be in high cost areas. On the third question, given that no facilities would be required for firearms storage or prisoner handling, it seems probable that building costs could be substantially lower than those incurred by the Police.

Overall, this gives rise to expectations of substantial over-estimation of accommodation costs in this scenario.

b) Estimated Cost of De-Merger

Using the above assumptions, the cost of the de-merger is estimated as shown in Table 4.

Table 3 Incremental Cost of De-Merger – Scenario 1

Thousand dollars

	Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4+
Salaries	33,200	33,200	33,200	33,200
Other opex	12,815	8,276	10,698	10,698
Total cash	46,015	41,476	43,898	43,898
Depreciation	6,881	9,463	12,051	12,051
Capital charge	6,945	11,790	16,635	16,635
Appropriations	59,841	62,729	72,584	72,584
Capital	92,596	64,600	64,600	

Source: NZ Police
NZIER

Overall, the on-going cash costs amount to \$44 million annually, although appropriations rise by \$72.5 million. Costs are somewhat higher in Year 1 to allow for additional training to bring new officers into the Traffic force plus some allowance for start-up costs.

Capital costs amount to \$222 million over the first three years. No further (de-merger related) capital injection is required beyond the 3-year period.

To put these figures in perspective, total Police appropriations in 2005-06 were \$1,019 million, plus capital requirements of \$29 million. Therefore, the above costing provides for an ongoing 7 per cent increase in appropriations for no additional service delivery, plus the equivalent of about 7 years of capital requirements.

These costs can largely be summarised as being staff and accommodation. Salaries make up three-quarters of the on-going cash expenses, while accommodation makes up most of the remaining expenses. The capital costs are dominated by provision of accommodation, which has flow-on effects to depreciation and the capital charge.

The analysis assumes that the de-merger process will be completed over a 3 year period. From an organisational viewpoint, it may be desirable to compress this to a single year. The major effect of doing this would be to bring all capital costs to bear in year 1. This would have consequent effects on depreciation and capital charges. Appropriations for years 2 onwards would be as shown for year 4 onwards in Table 4.

As noted above, the assumptions in this costing are conservative, resulting in a cost estimate that will be on the high side. The following section modifies these assumptions to provide a more realistic estimate.

3.4.2 Scenario Two

a) Assumptions

The assumptions in the preceding section were modified as follows:

- One-third of Traffic staff are assumed to be co-located with Police
- One-third of Traffic staff are in purchased buildings
- One-third of Traffic staff are in rental properties with the same capital cost as purchased buildings and returning a 9 per cent yield to the landlord
- Salaries of transferred staff are grandfathered, and will not increase until the Traffic pay scale reaches their existing pay rate
- Salaries of new sworn Traffic Officers are \$15,000 less than their Police counterparts (\$55,000 cf \$70,000)
- Associated staff costs (for all staff) are \$5,000 less than their Police counterparts (\$10,000 cf \$15,000)
- Attrition rates of Police staff transferred to Traffic are 12.5 per cent¹⁶

¹⁶ Attrition rates for current Police staff are around 5 per cent

- Attrition rates of new Traffic staff are 7.5 per cent

The salary rate was determined by looking at a range of other enforcement agencies within Government. The highest of these other rates was rounded upwards to arrive at the indicative rate of \$55,000.

The significance of the attrition rates is that this influences the salary structures and training rates.

The comments from the previous scenario regarding accommodation location and standard (hence cost) apply to this scenario also.

b) Estimated Cost of De-merger

The outcome of making these changes is shown in Table 5:

There is still a moderate cost involved in de-merging Traffic from Police, although the capital costs in particular are substantially less than shown in Table 4.

Salaries are lower than earlier estimated due to the reduction in “Other costs” associated with all staff numbers (\$10.7 million annually), and lower salaries for “new” Traffic Officers. The salary cost declines through time as the ex-Police staff resign and are replaced by new staff on the lower salary rates.

Table 4 Incremental Cost of De-Merger – Scenario 2

Thousand dollars

	Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4+
Salaries	18,110	15,560	13,340	11,390
Other opex	14,230	10,030	12,810	12,810
Total cash	32,340	25,590	26,150	24,200
Depreciation	4,956	5,771	6,585	6,585
Capital charge	3,023	4,551	6,079	6,079
Appropriations	40,319	35,912	38,814	36,864
Capital	40,313	20,367	20,367	

Source: NZIER

Other operating expenses increase as staff are accommodated in non-owned buildings, thereby incurring rental costs. Training costs are higher also to accommodate the increased attrition rate of ex-Police staff.

Depreciation and capital charges decrease relative to Table 4 due to the lower value of owned buildings.

Capital costs are just over one-third (37%) of the original estimate at \$81 million.

Once all ex-Police front-line staff have gone¹⁷ from the new Traffic organisation, then total salary costs of the two organisations would be lower than the current Police force, even with higher total staff numbers. However, total appropriations would still be approximately \$23 million higher annually¹⁸ than for the current Police organisation due to increased requirements for accommodation, vehicles, and other support, and lack of savings from vacated Police accommodation.

Overall, the on-going increase in appropriations of about \$37 million represents an increase of about 3.7 per cent in the current Police budget, while the capital requirements of this scenario are the equivalent of 3 years normal capital requirements.

3.4.3 Other Possible Cost Structures

The way that Traffic staff are accommodated is a key factor influencing the overall cost of any de-merger.

Scenario 1 used an extreme assumption that all Traffic staff would be accommodated in newly built or purchased accommodation. Scenario 2 reduced this purchased accommodation to just one-third of staff, and achieved other savings by sharing existing accommodation with the Police. This provided Scenario 2 with significant cost savings over Scenario 1.

Further cost reductions are possible for the de-merger. Specifically:

- greater sharing of Police accommodation is possible
- capital costs can be minimised by use of rental properties.

To test the effects of these factors, a scenario was costed assuming there would be no purchase of additional buildings for the Traffic organisation. This minimises the capital costs associated with the de-merger. Accommodation for the Traffic organisation was either shared with the Police or rented from the private market. The following table shows the on-going cost of the de-merger (Year 4 onwards) for varying degrees of shared accommodation.

¹⁷ At an attrition rate of 12.5 per cent, about half the ex-Police staff will be left after 5 years, and about a quarter will be left after 10 years.

¹⁸ In general, the higher the attrition rate, the sooner this eventual cost level will be reached. However, this will be partly offset by increased training costs in the transition period.

Table 5 Effect of Shared Accommodation

Proportion of shared accommodation	On-going Cost (\$m)
33%	32.3
50%	29.2
75%	24.6

Source: NZIER

In these scenarios, the net capital cost has been reduced to between \$13.6 and 15.1 million, all incurred in year 1.

All of the on-going costs are declining as ex-Police staff are replaced by Traffic Officers on lower pay rates. Further, as the proportion of shared accommodation increases, the eventual on-going cost of the de-merger decreases. For example, the eventual on-going cost for the 50 per cent shared accommodation option would end up at \$15 million per annum.

The points raised earlier regarding accommodation location and quality still apply to these scenarios. Even though no accommodation is being purchased in this scenario, it is assumed that equivalent location and quality property is being leased at lease rates appropriate for that accommodation. On this basis, moving to buildings adequate to needs located outside urban centres could reduce these costs further.

3.4.4 Summary of Cost of De-Merger

- The proposed de-merger as structured will incur additional costs over and above those incurred at present
- The cost of any such de-merger will depend largely on the accommodation options for the new Traffic organisation. Options costed generated medium-term increases in annual appropriations of \$25 to \$40 million, with start-up capital costs of at least \$15 million. Significantly higher capital costs are possible if buildings are purchased. On the other hand, it is possible that lower cost accommodation could be used.

4. Qualitative Analysis

4.1 Current Structure

a) Advantages

- Flexibility of resource use
 - Traffic units can be mobilised for general duties and vice-versa

– Traffic units trained for general duties

- All staff have full access to Police intelligence system (and provide inputs into intelligence system)
- Career options within Police

b) Disadvantages

- Relatively few permanent road safety “professionals”
- Road safety image (both within Police and amongst the public) – not “real” Police work
- Cause of public (dis)approval uncertain
- Higher individual costs of staff training
- Road safety focus can fluctuate depending on the call for general Police resources

c) Comments

The key advantage of the current structure is that all Officers are trained for the whole range of Police activities. This provides them with powers of investigation and arrest that were not previously associated with Traffic Officers. The broad range of skills and powers allows flexible delivery of Police resources.

This also provides scope to efficiently utilise Police time for both types of activities. For example, some Police trips can be avoided by diverting an officer on Traffic duties from a nearby location; or traffic offenders can be apprehended by Police Officers in the course of their general duties.

The broad range of Police outputs carries with it the possibility that road policing may lack the focus of a dedicated unit. Further, the focus on road safety may fluctuate depending on the call for resources from general police work – although any short-term diversion of resources would have to be corrected to allow the Police to meet their contractual obligations to deliver road safety outputs.

4.2 De-Merged Structure

a) Advantages

- Greater focus on areas of responsibility
- Focus maintained at all times
- Public (dis)approval, if any, targeted to specific organisation
- Lower training costs for traffic staff
- Potential lower salary costs for traffic staff

b) Disadvantages

- Career options more limited
- Recruitment of quality staff may be more difficult (due to salary, prestige, and career options)
- Higher accommodation costs due to two separate organisations
- Transitional costs
- Lesser access to Police intelligence
- Potentially, lower inputs into Police intelligence
- Probable reduction in powers of Traffic Officer reducing their ability to carry out ancillary activity when apprehending motorists, resulting in a higher total cost of enforcement activities
- Some callout response times will be slower (for both Police and Traffic).

c) Comments

There is a fundamental assumption that a de-merged Traffic force can carry out the range of duties currently associated with road safety. It is not clear that Traffic Officers would have the legal authority to carry out random stopping of vehicles, search vehicles (given cause to do so), or hold suspects until Police support arrived. While the Police have these powers, it is not clear that such powers would be automatically conferred on Traffic Officers.

On this basis, it is clear that the powers and authority required by Traffic Officers to carry out their role need to be formally defined, and compared with the powers that would be granted to them under current legislation. If their granted powers are found to be insufficient to carry out their role, then legislation to provide sufficient powers would be necessary.

4.3 Risks of Alternate Structures

The following are seen as some potential risks of moving away from the current Police/Traffic structure:

- De-merger processes will divert resources from outputs and generate poorer (initial) outcomes
- “Us” and “them” approach to joint activities between Police and Traffic could develop
- Building utilisation – may not be able to lease/sell/utilise relinquished office space
- If Traffic Officer salaries are based on the Police salary structure, then a flow-on effect to other employment groups is possible as those groups benchmark their own salaries against Traffic Officers
- If salaries of transferring staff are grandfathered, then there will be equivalent staff on different salary levels

- Lower salaries may also result in lower quality recruits and/or difficulty in recruitment
- General salary increases amongst traffic staff may be lower than that achieved by the Police. This will act as a financial disincentive for Police staff to transfer to the traffic service
- If Police staff do not join the traffic service, there would be a need for redundancies amongst Police staff to bring the Police organisation down to its new size (although at a 5% attrition rate, this could occur naturally over a 2 to 3 year timeframe)
- This would also mean a shortage of staff in the traffic service. The implications of this are that there will be high initial training costs, new staff will be inexperienced, and that road safety enforcement will suffer through a lack of staff during the start-up period
- Staff remaining in the Police may have less inclination to enforce road safety in the course of their general Police duty
- This will cause problems in managing both general Police and road safety activities at the current level
- Current road safety processes may require Police powers. In this case, legislation to provide Traffic Officers with sufficient powers would be required.

4.4 Summary of Qualitative Analysis

- A major advantage of a de-merger will be that both general policing and traffic safety enforcement will be more focussed
- A major disadvantage will be loss of the current economies of scope in performing both activities by a single group of officers
- There will be additional costs of providing the necessary infrastructure for two separate groups
- There is a risk of poorer coordination between Police and Traffic activities leading to poorer traffic outcomes
- Salaries will be an issue – regardless of whether they stay at Police levels, or are reduced to levels commensurate with the skills required for the job
- There is a risk of redundancies, with consequent costs of recruiting and training, and flow-on problems relating to having inadequate numbers of road safety staff
- As a consequence there is a risk of lower level of road safety enforcement and hence higher levels of crashes, deaths and injuries during the transition period.

5. Institutional Analysis

This paper contains two forms of institutional analysis. This section contains a descriptive analysis of traffic and policing activities to sort out some of the institutional design issues.

5.1 Analysis Structure

The broad approach that is being used here is a version of cost-benefit analysis. The underlying logic is that to consider a potential intervention, through the mechanism of a comparison between two ‘states of the world’ carried out by an exhaustive examination of the differences.

One state typically represents the status quo, and the other the result of the intervention – the ‘counterfactual.’ In this case it is hard to see exactly what the counterfactual is. The intent (and thus the broad outline) is obvious, but there are many ways of actually achieving the result. And for reasons that will emerge here the devil may well be in the details.

The issue faced here comes from the fact that a wide range of enforcement operational aspects¹⁹ of law and order in New Zealand are the duty of the New Zealand Police. After the rearrangements of 1992, this includes the traffic function which had, for essentially historical reasons, been separate. The question being considered is whether there might be advantages in rearranging the responsibilities to achieve a separation again.

The problem is that the opposite of unified might be apart, but there are many different ways that organisations can be apart. For instance, do they have separate ‘back offices’?²⁰ Is there any overlap – so while the two forces are managed to focus on their main functions, in a pinch (or opportunistically) they can substitute for one another, or just carry out the duties of the other²¹? Or is this a one way arrangement²²?

We return to this issue below.

¹⁹ It is noted that while other groups such as Customs, Immigration, and Fisheries have enforcement powers, those powers are also available to Police Officers. Police powers cover most or all enforcement areas, while other groups have powers in restricted areas.

²⁰ Briefly, this would encompass say personnel, finance property procurement and so on.

²¹ So any police person could stop and charge a driver with a traffic offence, and a traffic officer could similarly apprehend a burglar.

²² Perhaps the Police retain all the powers they now have; but the traffic officers have limited powers restricted essentially to carrying out the enforcement associated with traffic safety regulation. In this they might be given powers close to the ones held by Fisheries Officers. In passing we note that there was an ongoing debate in the late 1980s about the powers and associated activities of Traffic officers – mostly relating to the concept of “hot pursuit.”

5.2 Institutional Analysis

This is a simple and pretty elementary look at the “big” implications of the two sides of the law enforcement role via the following considerations:

1. Functions
2. Necessary facilities (skills, capital etc)
3. Potential costs.

To give some structure to the discussion we define the two sides as:

- **Policing** – the tasks associated with keeping law and order in the community generally. This includes preventing (detering) crime, investigating lawbreaking, and facilitating the judicial process
- **Traffic safety** – the tasks associated with keeping law and order on the roads. This includes preventing (detering) traffic wrong doing, dealing with infringements, investigating crash scenes, and facilitating the judicial process

From these definitions we can draw two simple views as conclusions:

- The demands of the policing tasks are wider and more complicated than the traffic roles
- The range of responsibilities in the policing function is greater than in the Traffic function. In particular, there is a range of regularly occurring duties that are normally judged as more socially important than the traffic tasks. These include investigating murders, and dealing with potential serious civil disorder.

Key ideas that underlie the big picture here are:

- Concentration and focus – people become better at their jobs by specialisation
- Giving people the right incentives throughout the organisation provides the right environment
- Matching task skill requirements with training – this is easier when the tasks are well-defined and delimited.

5.2.1 Functions

If we take the stylised views above as broadly indicative of the way the tasks are organised, the implications for the two roles are that:

a) Policing

- is multi-functional with a wide spread of responsibilities
- outputs are difficult to measure and monitor, while outcomes are clear but hard to directly influence

- involves a wide variety of tasks and personnel requirements
- has teams of various sizes to work on different jobs
- has evolved a significant preventative role, with specialists like community constables, youth workers etc.

b) Traffic enforcement

- is focused on a limited range of duties
- has a small number of clear, reasonably well-specified and measurable output (and even influenceable outcome) targets
- operates individually or in small teams
- has a limited direct operational preventative role other than through deterrence and presence.

5.2.2 Facilities

There are two sides to the necessary capital facilities here: human and physical.

5.2.3 Human capital

The human capital requirements for the two roles as presented here are:

a) Police

- Highly diversified skills required
- Major emphasis on ability to cope with/handle vast array of difficult and complicated situations, many hard to pre-specify for the purposes of training
- Limited ability to classify most of the work demands – emphasis on personal maturity and the ability to exercise judgement, situation appraisal, selection of response and so on
- High level of discretion exercised by all levels of the force.

b) Traffic enforcement

- Range of skills relatively limited
- Situations similarly restricted and mostly able to be pre-determined for training
- Scope for extensive training in the type of situations and the appropriate responses to hone and develop appropriate interactions
- Some discretion exercised.

5.2.4 Physical capital

The type of tasks carried out and the requirements associated with each suggests that the capital associated with the two roles have a high degree of

overlap. Each group requires a mobile communications system; access to the appropriate data bases on the move; the transport necessary for the task; and some kit to restrain and protect.

But within and beyond these broad requirements there seem to be some areas of non-overlap and specialisation. These might include:

a) Police

- Prisoner transport
- mass police transport; off road vehicles
- specialised headquarters, or evidence gathering transport.

b) Traffic

- Nimble on-road transport (motor cycles).

5.2.5 Potential Costs

The costs of de-merging the police and traffic functions from the Police organisation include:

- any increase in on-going operational costs
- any costs incurred as part of the transition from merged to de-merged
- any loss of benefits that may occur, either on-going or transitional

a) On-going operational costs

Earlier analysis suggested that costs of the de-merged entities would be 3 to 4 per cent higher than current operational costs. Most of these costs were salaries and accommodation.

The form of the separation is a key factor in the magnitude of these costs. In particular, the greater the degree to which the new Traffic organisation can occupy current premises, the lower the incremental cost.

Likewise, the greater the degree to which support services can be shared, the lower the incremental cost of de-merging. This might cover IT, finance, payroll and indeed, most of the non-frontline services.

The big long run prospect is the ability to economise on staff costs as the expected pay for a Traffic Officer skill set is below that of a Police Officer for reasons related to the functional differences. Some transition would probably be necessary to make this realisable.

A source of additional cost is the reduction in powers of traffic officers for which they will have to get help from the Police. There will be additional non-productive cost of coordination and time.

b) Transitional costs

A number of costs would be incurred during a transition to a de-merged state. These include such things as back-office systems (already referred to above), process development (or re-development) for each organisation, branding, and the costs of moving to new premises.

c) Loss of benefits

The earlier analysis sized the new organisations so that the primary benefits of law and traffic enforcement would remain similar to those delivered by the current organisation.

However, the economies of scope are likely to be less after de-merging. The economies of scope arise from detecting a crime (general or traffic related) while investigating or simply patrolling on the road. In a de-merged situation, Police will have the right to apprehend traffic rule violators but traffic officers may not have the right to apprehend other criminals. Any loss of economies of scope will have an effect on the total output.

Significant loss of benefits are possible during the transition period. This can arise through organisational disruption reducing resources available for delivery of outputs. Other infringements may be missed as the two organisations delineate their areas of enforcement operations.

5.3 Organisational Structures

The fact that the roles of Police and Traffic Officers have both a degree of functional specialisation and a degree of functional overlap allows these functions to be delivered by a range of organisational structures.

At one end of the spectrum, delivery of both services could be provided by a single organisation with most front-line staff trained to Police standards. While this scenario still envisages that some staff will be traffic specialists (e.g. crash investigators), and that delivery of some traffic services will be delivered by lesser trained staff (e.g. speed camera setup), delivery of most traffic related services will be carried by staff trained to higher standards than are strictly necessary for the job.

At the other end of the spectrum, each service would have its own delivery organisation. Staff of each organisation will be trained appropriately for the services they normally deliver. However, there will be situations where each organisation will have to call on the skills of the other.

Intermediate structures could provide traffic services from a branch of the Police. The essential characteristic of this structure is that the core of the traffic service is comprised of career Traffic Officers who have specialised training for that role, and who are remunerated according to their skills. This

core of traffic professionals would be supplemented by Police Officers carrying out traffic duties.

A range of structures is possible using this intermediate model by varying the degree to which traffic services are provided by the core traffic professionals. This proportion may range from one-third up to three-quarters (but could go so far as to incorporate a fully dedicated traffic unit within the Police – i.e. Police officers do not carry out any traffic duties).

Of the above structures, the current NZ Police organisation most closely resembles the first structure discussed. Likewise, the de-merger being discussed most closely resembles the second structure. While the intermediate structure has not been considered, it would appear that this is worthy of consideration.


The choice of structures rests to a large degree on the size of the overlap in functionality relative to the size of the total functional area. If the degree of overlap is high, then a unified structure would be most appropriate. If the degree of overlap is small, then separate structures may be more appropriate. An intermediate overlap may be sufficiently large to preclude separate organisations, but still provides a choice between a uniform single organisation and an intermediate branch structure.

Consider the diagram in Figure 9. This shows a representation of the overlap between the functional areas of police and traffic.

This diagram is drawn roughly to scale. The box marked ‘Traffic’ makes up 20.4 per cent of the area of the combined functions (allocating half the overlap to each function). If the two boxes are pulled apart, the combined area increases by 4 per cent – this matches the estimate made by the NZ Police of the necessary increase in staff numbers to maintain service provision of both services on de-merger.

Figure 9 Functional Overlap in Police and Traffic

Diagrammatic representation



Source: NZIER

This diagram highlights two questions:

- Is the functional overlap large enough to justify delivery of both services by a single organisation?
- Given the size of the overlap relative to the size of the Traffic function, is it appropriate to train all front-line traffic staff to Police standards?

The answers to these questions are critical to determining the appropriate organisational structure(s) to deliver police and traffic services. While the answers to those questions must come from areas outside this institutional analysis, the analysis to this point suggests that each of the possible structures has advantages and disadvantages. It is not clear that any particular structure has a compelling advantage over the others.

The diagram also offers a visual explanation of why there have been calls to de-merge Traffic from the Police. Essentially, the roles are largely separate with only a small degree of overlap. However, traffic is a significant portion of the combined activity area. Further, the public values the Police role more highly than the Traffic role, and therefore see the emphasis placed on traffic as providing a sub-optimal return from scarce Police resources.

5.4 Summary

This overview of institutional implications suggests that the roles of Traffic and Police Officers are different, but have some degree of overlap. These different roles could manifest themselves through functional specialisation, requiring differing skill sets and training, with consequent impacts on salary levels.

The combination of both functional differences and functional overlap suggest that a range of alternative delivery structures are possible. The choice of delivery structure depends largely on the degree of functional overlap.

Diagrammatic representation of the overlap between Police and Traffic raised questions about the appropriateness of the current delivery structure and training requirements for Traffic staff.

6. Overseas practice and experience

A detailed analysis of international experience is contained in Appendix B.

6.1 Summary of Overseas Experience

Overall, the international evidence is mixed. Most countries have combined police and traffic services. However, where traffic services are provided by Police staff, there is concern that traffic duties will be neglected. Specialisation of traffic services, even if it is within a unified organisation, is seen as desirable in delivery of road safety outputs.

Different countries have evolved different organisational structures to carry out their road and general policing functions. In most jurisdictions, one organisation carries out both functions, although road policing may still be a specialised function using dedicated resources within the overall organisation. Even in those cases where road policing is nominally the primary focus of the organisation (e.g. the California Highway Patrol), officers are still available for general policing duties.

A trend to ‘despecialisation’ was noted whereby there is an expectation that Police Officers are multi-skilled. This allows flexibility of deployment and easier integration into a larger organisation.

There are concerns over this multi-tasking approach in the UK because of the “*danger that it will lead in the longer-term to a reduced priority for roads policing*”. It may be argued that this concern is not relevant in New Zealand because the NZ Police act as contractors to the National Land Transport Fund in the provision of road safety services. In this context, the level of road safety activities undertaken by the NZ Police is determined, at least in part, externally to the Police force. In contrast, that decision is internal to the Police in the UK, thereby allowing the focus of policing to be shifted over time (and to vary across the country, as each local authority decides its own priorities).

Analysis of Police departments within Los Angeles County suggested there were actually dis-economies of scale – that is the unit cost of outputs increased as Police departments consolidated. This suggests the same outputs could be achieved at lesser costs through separated functionality. This may not be a good analogy to the de-merger analysis. The LA experience considers the provision of police services across a small geographic area relative to provision across a larger area. In contrast, the de-merger scenario considers provision of related services within the same geographic area.

7. Conclusions

7.1 Road Safety Trend

There have been substantial improvements in road safety in recent years. Many factors have contributed to this improvement. Besides Police enforcement and the road-safety advertising campaigns, there have been contributions from improvements in road design and vehicle quality. While some studies indicate that the combination of Police enforcement and promotional campaigns have been significant factors in achieving the observed improvement in road safety, it is not clear to what extent this has been affected by the merger in 1992. Hence it is not clear what will happen

if the institutional structure reverts back to something like the pre-merger situation.

7.2 Institutional effects

The institutional analysis suggests that there is a degree of specialisation of functions and skills when comparing the roles of Police and Traffic Officers. In institutional terms, this will manifest itself in terms of staff training and pay.

Loss of economies of scope were noted as a probable disadvantage. Productivity gains through specialisation could act to offset these losses. Therefore, overall outputs (outcomes) of any de-merger would depend on the relative sizes of these losses and gains.

Costs would be determined by the form of the separation. Costs could be minimised if the organisations were to share resources.

Reduced powers for Traffic Officers were noted as a source of increased costs. This would occur both when requesting assistance from Police (thereby requiring involvement of a second set of officers), and in general coordination of activities.

Loss of output during transition was noted as a potentially large cost.

Analysis of the functional overlap between Traffic and Police suggests that a range of delivery structures are possible. Even if a single delivery organisation is used, that organisation can have a range of internal structures which impact on the relative skill levels and training required for each function. Each delivery structure has both advantages and disadvantages, and it was not clear that any particular structure was compellingly better than the others.

In summary, the institutional analysis confirms many of the points noted elsewhere in this paper – specifically, there will be some loss of benefits from a de-merger with uncertain prospects of offsetting productivity gains. Likewise, the potential for poorer outcomes during the transition period was noted as an important factor.

7.3 Public Perception

In general, the public have a high degree of confidence in the Police. While public confidence has varied through time, this variation appears to have little overall linkage to traffic enforcement. Further, recent survey results give higher confidence ratings than those achieved during the late 1990s.

In 2006, a large majority (90%) of the population considered the level of road safety enforcement was either about right or should be increased. This

indicates a high level of support for road safety activities. However, other survey material indicates public ambivalence over traffic enforcement being a Police role.

Analysis of information flows to the Police from the general public shows no sign of adverse reaction to traffic enforcement. Notifications to Police about suspicious behaviour have been increasing steadily, while general information flows have been at historically high levels over recent years.

Surveys taken between 2003 and 2007 showed declining support for full separation of traffic enforcement from the Police, and increasing support for those functions to be retained by the Police. However, they showed very strong support (80%) for either formal separation of traffic enforcement from general policing, or greater distinction between the roles within the Police. Continuation of the status quo is the least preferred option (17%).

It is possible that this represents a public desire for Police resources to be focused on general police activities without diversion by traffic duties. However, it is not clear that this is a rational view. Studies have shown that the public overestimate the risk from crime, and overseas studies indicate that the risk associated with motor vehicles is under-estimated. The public's expressed desire for some form of separation of police and traffic duties may stem from this mismatch of perceptions and reality.

In summary, there is no evidence to support a view that public confidence in the Police is being eroded by traffic enforcement. Further, a majority of the public wish to see traffic functions retained by the Police. However, an even larger majority wish to see some form of separation of these functions, either formally or through a greater distinction between activities if both functions were retained within the Police organisation.

7.4 Financial impact

It is anticipated that if a de-merger is effected that staff numbers will need to be increased from current levels to maintain outcomes in general policing and road safety. Further, physical separation of the two organisations would probably be necessary for cultural and data security reasons.

These factors lead to estimates of additional appropriations of about \$30 to \$40 million annually in the medium term to fund the new organisations. Basic capital costs incurred at start-up amount to approximately \$16 million, plus any capital required for accommodation purposes.

These costs will be incurred without any expectation of increased outputs from the two new organisations. While there is potential for efficiency gains, identification of such gains would require a more in-depth study than this high-level overview.

7.5 International Comparisons

Overall, the international evidence is mixed. Most countries have combined police and traffic services. However, where traffic services are provided by Police staff, there is concern that traffic duties will be neglected. Specialisation of traffic services, even if it is within a unified organisation, is seen as desirable in delivery of road safety outputs.

7.6 Overall Conclusion

From a financial perspective, a de-merger will involve additional costs in the short and medium term with no certainty of any additional benefits to society.

From an institutional viewpoint, it is unclear whether the loss of economies of scope in a de-merger will be offset by gains from specialisation. However, functional differences in the roles of Police and Traffic Officers suggest there is scope for a range of delivery options.

From a public perception viewpoint, the public strongly support road safety activities but are ambivalent about the Police being the delivery organisation. In fact, the public strongly support some form of functional separation of police and traffic activities. However, it is possible that this support is based on a faulty perception of the relative risks from motor vehicles and crime.

From a practical viewpoint, moving to de-merged entities would present a range of transitional issues with potential to have significant adverse impacts on outputs of both general policing and road safety.

Overall, the analysis here provides an expectation that, at best, the long-run outcome of de-merging the traffic functions from the Police will match the current delivery structure. This would be achieved at the expense of significant transitional turmoil, increased costs in the short and medium terms, and potentially significant short-term losses of benefits.

This suggests that a full de-merger of the traffic functions from the Police is not worthwhile from most viewpoints. However, the public desire to see some form of separation should be examined in more detail, and addressed in some suitable manner.

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Appendix A International Road Policing

A.1 Overview

A potentially informative area of investigation is how other countries, particularly those with a strong record of success in traffic enforcement (e.g. Victoria, Australia), have chosen to provide their traffic enforcement services and what their experience has been.

In the following we provide a brief overview of some of the approaches to policing (including traffic and transportation) in other countries. (The rationale for the different organisational forms, and predicted outcomes from them is touched on in a separate section on institutional perspectives.)

The main theme of this brief review of the literature is the variety of approaches to the organisation and operation of general policing, and also the numerous ways in which traffic policing is structured and integrated with general policing. In other words, in considering the pros and cons of different organisation forms, a merged/de-merged dichotomy is an oversimplification of the policy choices that are made in practice, and of how relationships between general policing and traffic policing may evolve over time.

A.2 Comparative analysis

Hamelin and Spenlehauer (2005)²³ carried out an international comparative study of road policing in France, California, New South Wales and New Zealand. The overarching questions addressed by the paper include:

- How to ensure an appropriate, sustainable level of traffic enforcement?
- Should a traffic police force be specialised and what does specialisation mean in this context?
- Does professional specialisation of police hamper overlap with other types of policing (i.e. criminal)?

The authors identify three types of traffic police specialisation – institutional, functional, and one having to do with professional identity. They note (page 3) that within ‘institutional specialisation’ a distinction can be made between organisational and divisional.²⁴

In the former case, illustrated by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) the organisation in question seems exclusively devoted to

²³ “Traffic police and policing: a comparative and socio-historical perspective” Fabrice Hamelin and Vincent Spenlehauer. Paper prepared for 2005 Australasian Road Safety Research Policing Education Conference.

²⁴ We also note that in the United States, there is typically a ‘horizontal’ division within the Police forces where ‘serious’ crime is handled by the State Police and FBI, while minor offences (including traffic enforcement) is typically handled by the local Sherriff’s department.

road policing. In the latter – in New Zealand as in New South Wales – this is true only of a branch or division of the organization. These different structural modalities can, however, coexist within a single territory, as illustrated by the bi-polar approach to road policing in the United States. Throughout the 1930s the paramilitary, bureaucratic, autonomous body that was the CHP developed in parallel with the creation in an increasing number of local police forces of an Accident Prevention Bureau. In France the formation of specialist units in some municipal police forces is currently tending to take the place of a simple "operational specialization", in which officers are allocated to this activity without there being a specialist body as such.

Further:

It is not easy to reach firm conclusions on the supposed impact of either of these two models. Nonetheless, the development of the two different structural modes is not without significance, as the New Zealand and California examples show. The results of New Zealand's road toll campaign over recent years have been as impressive as the resources provided and the relative autonomy that road police have retained and reinforced since the 1992 merger. And yet these results would seem to be largely due to the efforts of a particular generation of road police officers, former ministry of transport personnel highly professionalized in this field before the merger with the police.

...

The authors (p.5) point to a trend to functional ‘de-specialisation’ of traffic police forces. This is seen as attributable to the work of officers for whom versatility can be an asset, especially in terms of recognition and integration into the larger police system, which practices road policing in ‘redundant rivalry.’ *However, this de-specialisation is also the outcome of what has come to be expected of road police, either by other police forces or by the authorities and the population.* A specific example is the use of CHP patrolmen as backup for local police forces in cases of violation of the penal code.

The paper also discusses (p.6) the importance of road police forces maintaining solid cooperative links with fellow police bodies at institutional and professional levels. *Lasting stability for a road police force and its success in road safety terms also requires consistent, explicit cooperation with fellow police officers.*

A.3 The California Highway Patrol

Hamelin and Spenlehauer (2006)²⁵ analyses the evolution of the CHP. It reports (p.279) that in 1996, the California State Police with its 400 agents was merged with the CHP. It also notes that the CHP is in some respects an aberration in relation to other examples in the US and elsewhere. Specific points supporting this view are:

- it is a police force that can and regularly does play a part in law enforcement, yet this is not the main point of the demands made of it by government authorities at local, state and federal level
- it is a police force that can and does perform criminal policing but this is not a core part of the professional identity of CHP officers
- it is a local peacekeeping force, but one that reacts largely to one form of criminality, delinquency and antisocial behaviour: that relating to car and road use.

The CHP is officially responsible to the Agency of Housing, Transformation and Business, and not to the Californian Department of Justice.

A.4 Los Angeles County

Finney (1997)²⁶ examines the question of scale economies in police departments and whether the empirical evidence supports the degree of consolidation observed in Los Angeles County.²⁷

The study seeks an efficiency explanation for the extensive consolidation of police services, but finds no such grounds. The analysis estimates that the cost of producing either safety or arrests rises at a faster rate than do the respective outputs. ...

The study's finding of decreasing returns implies that whatever quantity of police services the contracting municipalities are presently purchasing could have been produced by the jurisdictions at lower cost.

A.5 UK road policing

The 2006 Proceedings of the House of Commons Transport Committee focuses on several main themes including the decline of road policing:

²⁵ "Road policing as a state tool: Learning from a socio-historical analysis of the California Highway Patrol" Fabrice Hamelin and Vincent Spenlehauer. *Policy and Society, Vol.16, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 261-284.* Routledge.

²⁶ Finney, Miles (1997) "Scale economies and police department consolidation: evidence from Los Angeles." *Contemporary Economic Policy. Vol. XV, January 1997.*

²⁷ "Consolidation" in this context refers to the use of intergovernmental agreements to produce police services. In Los Angeles County, such agreements are principally with the County Sheriffs' Department.

In the course of conducting a benchmarking study, the Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales (PSAEW) discovered that there was no standard definition of a roads police officer. The Association indicated that owing to the changes in force structures and the changing nature of roads policing there appeared to be no agreed definition.[16] The Government provided the following definition of the police traffic function:

- *Operational—staff who are predominantly employed on motor-cycles or in patrol vehicles for the policing of traffic and motorway related duties. This does not include officers employed in accident investigation, vehicle examination and radar duties.*
- *Operational Support—staff who are predominantly employed to support the traffic function of the force including radar, accident investigation, vehicle examination and traffic administration. Includes officers working with hazardous chemicals.*
- *Organisational Support—Administrative staff predominantly serving the internal needs of the traffic function of the force.[17]*

What these definitions acknowledge implicitly, but not explicitly, with the use of the word 'predominantly', is that traffic functions may be carried out by ordinary police officers and roads police officers may just as easily be deployed to other functions. The boundaries between specialised units have largely dissolved with the introduction of 'multi-tasking'. (2006, p.2)

Further:

The experience of police forces is that roads policing requires specialised knowledge and skills, specific training and equipment. The practice of treating roads policing as a secondary or additional duty of officers engaged in other activities offers chief constables a high degree of flexibility in how they use their officers, but there is a significant danger that it will lead in the longer-term to a reduced priority for roads policing. This is nowhere more in evidence than in the fact that it is no longer possible to say with any certainty how many officers are now engaged with roads policing.

Multi-tasking in this way requires careful monitoring, and if it is found that the arrangement further impedes the ability of police officers to dedicate the necessary time and resources to operational roads policing, a different approach should be introduced. The special role of roads police officers must be recognised and protected,... (House of Commons, 2007, p.4)

and, on the use of non-sworn staff:

Policing the roads is a complex and resource-intensive activity. The government has attempted to free police time by transferring responsibility for some roads policing tasks to non-sworn officers. In using subsidiary staff the Department for Transport and the Home Office must ensure that the lines of control and areas of responsibility are very clearly delineated. The onus is on the Government to ensure there is no drift of responsibility. In assessing the impact of the Highways Agency Traffic Officers the Government should evaluate the impact not only on traffic flows, but on other factors such as safety and protection of crash scenes and evidence. It should monitor any actual conflict between the responsibility of the Highways Agency to keep the network flowing and the need for the police to investigate crashes in considerable detail. The Government should set out guidelines to resolve these issues to determine a sensible balance between these two conflicting factors. (House of Commons, 2007, p.5)

A.6 New South Wales

The abstract to Carnis (2006) comments that because of its characteristics, the Police organization represents a form of bureaucracy, which has to allocate its resources to reach objectives defined by the political authorities. The contribution rests upon a theoretical framework to circumscribe the consequences of such heterogeneity for the allocation of resources. This framework is used to understand the evolution of the New South Wales Police Service and especially the adjustments of its traffic branch to face up to such environmental evolutions.²⁸

²⁸ Full paper only available in French.